No Substitute for a Popular Uprising

By: Dr. Salah Abdel Jawwad*

On November 5th, an open panel session was held in Ramallah, sponsored by Muwatin, the Palestinian Center for the Study of Democracy. Muwatin has held several similar events since the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada, well attended by wide sectors of the academic, political and community leadership of Ramallah and Birziet University. This particular panel session witnessed lectures presented by PA negotiator Yasser Abed Rabbo, Prof. of political science at Birzeit University Dr. Salah Abdel Jawwad, and Dr.Mahmoud Muharreb from Tajamu’ - the ‘48 Palestinian party leaded by Azmi Bishara.    The following article is a translation from Arabic of his presentation.

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I wish to speak about three main points. The first addresses general aspects concerning the role of knowledge in this Intifada. Second, I will speak of the issue of acquired experience of the Palestinian national movement and some of the lessons we can garner from this experience. Third, I would like to discuss the question of whether we have the necessary components for the continuation of the Intifada, and what these components are. 

The Role Of Knowledge In The Present Intifada

I would like to begin by addressing the issue of the accumulation and use of knowledge in any political movement. People accumulate knowledge through their experiences, internalizing this knowledge without the need for embarking on a new experiences. Unfortunately this has not always been the case in the Palestinian national movement. You all know what happened in Jordan [during the 1970 Civil War which ended in the expulsion of the PLO to Lebanon] and in Lebanon [during its civil war including the Israeli invasion of 1982.] We all know about the transgressions that took place in Jordan, which gave the regime justification to strike us. (1) These actions were exactly like those carried out in what is called in the ‘Fakahani Empire’ (2). In both cases, the governments found excuses within the conduct of the PLO to repress the Palestinian national struggle and fulfill larger objectives of eliminating the ‘troublesome’ presence of the Palestinians. Yet despite the accumulation of Palestinian experience, we can see that in the current Intifada, some of the same mistakes are recurring which is very problematic.

In my opinion, there are three problems we face when it comes to the accumulation of knowledge.

 First, the accumulation of knowledge of the Palestinian national movement has not been fully documented. Therefore, whenever a new group comes onto the political scene that has no prior conception of the previous struggle, it enters into an entirely new experience and starts from ‘point-zero’. Hamas is a perfect example of this. As a result of the absence of documentation of the military experience of the PLO,Hamas [founded only at the end of 1987] began a whole new experience on its own [committing many tactical errors.]

Another second problem we face is the issue of the accumulation of knowledge that is known but not used. For example, the accumulation of knowledge throughout the first Intifada gave evidence that masked persons (Mulathameen) may lead to a dysfunction or failure [as it permitted Israel to send undercover (masked) agents that could not be detected, to arrest or liquidate wanted individuals. But despite this, Palestinian society repeats today the same mistake [still masking themselves during demonstrations]. 

The third problem is the slowness of transforming knowledge into practice. For example, the problem of an armed popular nature of the Intifada. You will note that about 10 days after the start of this Intifada, an overall feeling on the Palestinian street became apparent which expressed quite clearly that this [the militarization as a main ingredient of the popular struggle] was wrong. But despite this, there is a slowness to implement these conclusions. I warn about this because we are confronting an enemy that changes and reforms its tactics quickly, accumulating knowledge through experience and transforming it into action. Even in simple matters this is apparent. For instance, if there is an explosion from a car rigged with explosives one day, the next day Israel sets up barricades and checkpoints so that they can control certain areas where they once were more exposed or weak.

We can add to this problem the issue of knowledge that is willfully shunned as well as the issue of being in a state of ‘no-knowledge’. We are presently engaged in a battle of such gravity without really knowing what we want. What is our strategy? Do we have a plan or not? What are we going to do with the economic situation? What is the Israeli strategy? This lack of knowledge is not only limited to major and strategic matters but it also includes simple and tactical aspects as well. You will notice that not one  Palestinian newspaper or even our national security forces knows the kind of missiles and rockets fired at us by Israeli helicopters. Wrong terms are used all the time. This is hugely problematic. We must confess to our own lack of knowledge. 
There is also the issue of how Palestinians tend to position their acquired knowledge into pre-set molds that we claim to be absolute truth. This is a particularly problem suffered by the opposition. For example, they said that “if we go to Sharem Al Sheikh [to discuss a cease fire], then this is a concession and a form of surrender”.Barak went to Sharm Al Sheikh.BUT Nobody told him that he was going to surrender. We are using pre-formed clusters of knowledge in this battle that may indeed impede our ability to analyze, understand and learn.
There is also the issue of knowledge and candidness. When Mahmoud Al Imwasi [a Palestinian Tantheem member killed recently in Beitunia near Ramallah] and another two were martyred, Al Ayyam newspaper and Palestine television told us that the Israelis opened fire at them near a checkpoint. This is not the reality. The truth is that two days before their death, these young men formed an ambush and shot at an Israeli bus. Two days later, they decided to go and start shooting again. The Israelis set up an ambush for this group and they were killed. It is very important that this kind of information reaches the people because this is the only thing that might stop other young men from making the same mistake. It is very important that there is a kind of candidness about the information we use and need. 
Finally, I wish to address the issue of knowledge and democracy. I for example, have written a number of articles that, for perhaps minor criticism, were turned down by some newspapers for publication. Here let us learn from Israeli society. We have all seen translations from the Hebrew press. It is amazing how someone like Gideon Levy [a Haaretz newspaper correspondent who addresses human rights violations in the Occupied Territories] may say something 180 degrees different from the public opinion. Knowledge and democracy is a very important matter. This issue can be expanded to include the subject of knowledge and theoretical debate. Throughout the Intifada there has been a complete absence of debate. Let us say you write an article with a certain viewpoint - a viewpoint which even goes against the public conception of things. You might even mention people’s names. You will not get a response; there is no argument. 

Lessons of the Past
Now, to my second major point – that of the important lessons we should learn from the history of our struggle. 

The Militarisation Of The Intifada
Allow me to begin by talking about military actions and their dimensions. It is my feeling that we must go back to a popular and peaceful-natured Intifada, with the possibility of adding to this studied military action that would not give justification for a comprehensive Israeli response. Allowing armed Palestinian components to participate in popular demonstrations, the phenomenon of masked persons, and the shooting at soldiers and settlements from the heart of cities in Area A, must stop, even though we know that this comes in the context of self-defense. Opening fire from a distance is fruitless, is not serious and gives the Israelis justification to use its military force, in addition to involving the Palestinian society in a total war at a time when neither the PA, nor the society nor the Opposition are ready for such a confrontation. Experience has proven that total confrontation and wars with Israel have all ended in favor of Israel, including the 1973 war in which the Arabs took the initiative. The only wars which the Arabs won were the War of Attrition over the Suez Canal and the resistance in South Lebanon, which were, by the way, not total wars. We also were victorious in the first Intifada because we relatively stripped the Israelis of their major points of strength [i.e. the full use of their military].
The use of weapons as has been displayed throughout the current Intifada plays into the enemy’s hands and hence into the conditions and rules which they set. The problem is that we have been through this experience in which the Palestinian resistance – in Jordan in 1970 or in the civil war in Lebanon or in the 1982 war – became entangled in total and decisive confrontations ending in catastrophes. So, the use of weapons today gives the Israelis a justification to talk about armed confrontations “between two sides” and to use deceiving terminology such as ‘war’ that perpetuates this false image of the situation.
What are the dangers of military action? First, it gives justification for the enemy to use their military force – tanks, planes, etc. to quell an Intifada, which is popular in essence. It gives them justification to completely destroy the economic infrastructure and to redraw maps through temporarily or permanently displacing the population. I do not understand why shooting occurs from Beit Jala from an area that the Israelis are in need of to connect the Jerusalem area with the settlement bloc of Gush Etzion – an area they wish to annex. If Palestinians want to shoot, this is an option – I do not exclude this option. But as I have said, this has to be done in a studied manner and from certain areas. In all cases, it should not involve us in total confrontation. 
Palestinians have legitimate and symbolic motives to carry arms. The reason carrying arms is an issue for Palestinians is because arms have always been banned to Palestinians. During the British Mandate, Palestinians were executed for carrying weapons. In Jordan, they prohibited us from carrying arms. That is why weapons in Lebanon gave us a feeling of our identity. 
Here I would like to stress something which might ‘go against the grain’. The wide presence of arms excludes large sectors of the people from the struggle, for example, women. Contrary to the first Intifada, women are almost completely absent from today’s confrontations. Large sectors of the population cannot participate in the Intifada as it is now. In my opinion, the urge to use weapons leads to reinforcing an undemocratic trend in society. Violence is not only directed against another society. Many times violence has negative impacts on the society itself. 
On the matter of weapons and the Intifada as a whole, it is necessary to formulate a strategy that would not lead to either a direct confrontation or to a total war between the two societies. We need to suffice with confrontations that take on the nature of a resistance from[OF] an unarmed population that seeks national liberation from an occupational army and settlers. 

Emulating the Lebanese [Hizbullah] experience is not possible for three major reasons. First, there are no supportive countries to train us and give us weapons and money like the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the Iranian support. Second, the West Bank today, with its tiny area – approximately 5,000 square kilometers – has 400,000 settlers distributed in 400 settlement locations. There are no points of protection to take refuge in. So, if there is going to be any kind of military activity, it should be through simple and distanced hits, where the boiling point would remain limited in general. Third, Israel’s goals and motives in South Lebanon are different than those in the West Bank. As such, the response will be different, largely because of the settlers. 
Despite this, I should note that there is a difference in the situations in the West Bank and Gaza. First, Israel’s desire to control the Gaza Strip is less strong. Second, the possibility of becoming armed and getting support is better in Gaza because of the Egyptian border; third, the settler presence in Gaza is marginal and fourth, the geographical contiguity and the level of struggle is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. 

Religious War or Popular Struggle
The second lesson that we must pay attention to is the religious elements to this struggle. The struggle must not be transformed into a religious struggle. To my surprise, there are some national, secular voices who, when demonstrations took place in the Arab world, chanted “Khaybar Khaybar Ya Yahoud, Jaish Muhammed Sa Yaoud” [Khaybar, Khaybar oh Jews, Mohammed’s army will return. Here, Khaybar refers to a famous Koranic battle in the first years of Islam in which the Jews of Khaybar were killed by the Muslim armies]. The struggle has the potential to be transformed into a religious struggle and as such would become a very bloody confrontation. Remember the religious wars in Europe? They used to last 100 years. Even wars that are not primarily religious but which take on a religious nature – like what happened in Lebanon - are very bloody. They are different than other types of war – are very destructive, and operate without borders, rules or logic. In my opinion this could only lead to two things: first, the price of this war will be paid in large by the Palestinians. Second, it will lead to the involvement of the Arab world in a confrontation for which it is not ready. 
It is true that one of the major achievements of the Intifada is what has taken place in the Arab world. [Referring to the large militant demonstrations which have taken place from Morocco to Yemen.] The new generation of Arab youth for the most part had no idea about Nasserism. Now these 18, 20 and even 15 year olds are starting to discover the deep Arab experirience of Pan-Arabism. What has been taking place throughout the Arab world during the present Intifada is not, in my opinion, just a passing phase but is rather a turning point. It is not that these people are demonstrating only for Jerusalem and its status, but because there is a linkage between the issue of Jerusalem and the occupation and between something important to them, which is the issue of subordination and oppression [by their own regimes and western imperialism.] So, there is a review of the Pan-Arab sentiments predominant in the 1950s.
 
Possibilities of Continuing the Struggle
Let me now address the question of whether we can continue the Intifada. 
First, let us see what the Intifada has achieved until now: The Intifada has reaffirmed something that was forgotten - that the West Bank and Gaza is occupied land. Since the Oslo Accords and because of them, this issue has been absent. The problem with the Oslo Accords and all subsequent accords is that international legitimacy was stripped away, except for (in some cases) Resolutions 242 and 338, which are ambiguous resolutions to begin with. Let me remind you that the Palestinian national movement only accepted 242 after independence was declared in Algiers on November 15, 1988, and even then with reservations from a few parties not to mention a few who voted against these resolutions.
 A second accomplishment of the Intifada has been its ability to clearly expose the fact that there is no possibility for peace with the settlements and without the return of Arab Jerusalem to the Palestinians.
Third, the Intifada achieved the solidarity and movement of the Arab world and fourth, it has achieved to certain degrees, internal national unity. 
I must however warn that these achievements are not concrete. Some of these need reinforcement, while other are still in the process of becoming. It can be said for instance, that national unity has been achieved: but what are we unified over? It is not clear until now. We need a new program approved by the Authority and the opposition. Without it, there is no possibility to continue. 
As for the accomplishments within the Arab world, this indeed is a great thing. However it is important to transform these demonstrations with religious slogans to the major issues of our struggle, which is transforming this popular rage into action. A similar popular Arab rage happened in 1948 – from Aden (Yemen) to Masqat (Morroco). But when the war began, there were no more than 4,000 volunteers in Palestine. The same thing happened during the Gulf War in 1990. Most Arab masses supported Iraq - but how do you transform this into a logical plan of action? 
Having acknowledged the achievements, we must also stress their incompleteness and need of reinforcement. The point now is what do we want from the Intifada? Do we want to improve the conditions for negotiations? Or do we want independence? With negotiations or without? Here we must specify a strategy. But this strategy must be compatible with our capabilities. We must not put a goal that is more than what we can achieve. 
As a transitional step, we must eliminate the causes which have lead to an armed explosion. This is in the interest of the Palestinians. Then we must reassess and reformulate new conditions for confrontation. The process involves basically gathering your forces, assessing what has happened, eliminating the causes of the armed explosion that the Israelis wanted and then trying to think of how you want the Intifada to be. This strategy needs detailing of an overall plan as well as a group of smaller detailed plans. 

In my opinion the Intifada can not succeed and continue without change and reform. For example, on Arab satellite television stations there have been a series of campaigns to collect donations for the Intifada. Throughout their campaigns however, commentators say things like “don’t worry, we will not give it to the PA.” On the contrary, such monies should be given to the PA, but the Authority should get rid itself of corruption, unsuitable characters and its own inactivity. 
There are apparatuses today that are dead, such as the Palestinian Legislative Council. It has no presence or role in what is taking place. This situation cannot continue within the existing context. One must realize that the Palestinian community inside the 1948 borders created 257 national committees after the first week of the Partition Plan Resolution in November 1947. Today there is an absence of such activity. One of the reasons is that this Authority was not elected. The question may be raised of whether we should truly begin a process of reform in the midst of this battle? I believe we can. 
In spite of the Zionist nature of Israeli society, the struggle will be decided in Palestine and in Israel. Here we need to see how we deal with Israeli public opinion. This is very important. We should not transform what has happened into a total confrontation between two societies. In every way possible we should not allow the creation of an Israeli consensus. If there is an Israeli consensus, we are in a big problem.
 
Before closing I wish to comment that we must be conscious of the fact that ultimately, our Achilles heel will be the economy. If we are able to avoid the pre-planned Israeli aggression and are able to wage a confrontation of attrition and strong popular resistance, our weak point will be the economic component. Economic activity needs a special kind of arrangement specially coordinated with the Arab world.

Footnotes
(1) The reference here is to the hijacking of three international airplanes by the PFLP that were brought to the Jordanian desert. The operation together with the international attention around it gave King Hussein the excuse to crush and expel the PLO, in what is commonly referred to as Black September.
(2) This referes to the neighborhood in West Beirut in which the PLO established its center of operations, after having been expelled from Jordan. It wwas renouned for its independence or mini-state status, inviting confrontations with Chrsitian Lebanese Militia.